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Abstract 
 
This study examines the effects of firm performance and corporate governance on chief executive 
officer (CEO) compensation in an emerging market, Pakistan. Using a more robust Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation approach for a sample of non-financial firms listed at 
Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) over the period 2005 to 2012, we find that both current and 
previous year accounting performance has positive influence on CEO compensation. However, 
stock market performance does not appear to have a positive impact on executive compensation. 
We further find that ownership concentration is positively related with CEO compensation, 
indicating some kind of collusion between management and largest shareholder to get personal 
benefits. Inconsistent with agency theory, CEO duality appears to have a negative influence, while 
board size and board independence have no convincing relationship with CEO compensation, 
indicating board ineffectiveness in reducing CEO entrenchment. The results of dynamic GMM 
model suggest that CEO pay is highly persistent and takes time to adjust to long-run equilibrium.  
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Introduction 
There has been an enormous growth in research on executive compensation over the last two 
decades with primary focus on compensation of chief executive officer (CEO). Much of this 
research focuses on the question whether executive compensation contracts can be justified in 
terms of their contribution to the firm financial performance (Devers et al., 2007, van Essen et al., 
2012a). According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), executives are self-interested 
and may behave opportunistically at the expense of shareholders’ interests. Therefore, corporate 
boards are supposed to confine executive opportunism and align the executives’ interests with that 
of shareholders by better monitoring through effective corporate governance mechanisms, and 
designing efficient pay contracts that typically link executive compensation with firm 
performance.  
The objective of this study is to examine whether CEO compensation is influenced by firm 
performance and corporate governance practices in an emerging market, Pakistan, where CEOs 
are presumed to be more powerful than the boards of directors and where family or controlling 
shareholders are more likely to exploit interests of minority shareholders. Specifically, this study 
examines the role of firm performance, board structure and concentrated/family ownership in 
designing CEO compensation contracts.   
The Asian socio-economic and behavioral peculiarities and institutional settings are different 
from Western World and studies conducted in Western World have limited implications for Asian 
countries (Fan et al., 2011, Ghosh, 2006, Gibson, 2003, Hofstede, 1980, Sun et al., 2010, van Essen 
et al., 2012a). While there is some evidence on the link between firm performance, corporate 
governance and compensation from other Asian countries, the Pakistani context is peculiar for a 
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number of reasons. First, concentrated and family ownership is more common in Pakistan than for 
instance, in Japan and Korea. Similarly, while Chinese firms have more ownership concentration 
than in Pakistan, the nature of ownership concentration in Chinese firms is different as the State 
usually holds high stakes in large firms (e.g., Bryson et al., 2014). On the other hand, concentrated 
ownership in Pakistan is maintained by non-government shareholders. Non-government 
ownership concentration makes firms like private owned firms which may have different 
implications for CEO compensation.  
Second, legal and political environment in Pakistan is weaker and the overall governance is 
poor (Rehman et al., 2012). The government effectiveness index and regulatory quality index 
estimated by World Bank remained negative in the last decade or so. In addition, there is more 
foreign influence on governance and corporate environment. Pakistan has been under the influence 
of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other funding agencies for so long. Moreover, Pakistani 
economy is plagued with more corruption than many other Asian countries. According to 
Transparency International, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) never cross 30 for Pakistan 
(100 shows no corruption). Therefore, people in Pakistan (including executives) are more prone to 
unethical and opportunistic behavior (Mujtaba and Afza, 2011). Third, the disclosure requirement 
about CEO compensation is stronger in Pakistan. Companies are required to report all the 
components of CEO compensation. This is not the case for most of the other Asian countries (see, 
e.g., Basu et al., 2007, Conyon and He, 2011, Kato et al., 2007).  
Given above differences, Pakistani market provides a unique context to study how the boards 
see firm performance as a determinant of CEO compensation? What role concentrated/family 
ownership plays in setting CEO pay and how board structure affects CEO compensation decisions? 
These questions are particularly interesting in countries like Pakistan as two seminal studies 
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(Durnev and Kim, 2005, Klapper and Love, 2003) show that firm-level corporate governance 
practices matter more in countries with weaker legal systems and investor protection.1 
Our study contributes to the extant literature in a number of ways. First, our study can be 
considered as a response to calls for more research on understanding how managers of emerging 
market firms are compensated and factors that influence these decisions (see, Fan et al., 2011, Sun 
et al., 2010, van Essen et al., 2012a). Fan et al. (2011), for instance, note that ‘Until now, we still 
do not know much about how managers of emerging market firms are paid and promoted and 
factors that influence these decisions’ (p. 211). Therefore, by analyzing CEO compensation in an 
emerging market of Pakistan, we provide important contribution to international literature on 
executive compensation.  
Second, we find evidence that despite boards tend to be weaker as compared to the 
management in Pakistan, CEO compensation is positively associated with firms’ accounting 
performance. This is first hand evidence in Pakistan2. Further, we find that board size and presence 
of non-executive directors do not contribute towards CEO compensation in any direction. This 
reflects the contextual settings of Pakistan where non-executive directors are hired from within the 
family or they are proxies of controlling shareholders, making board structure irrelevant. Contrary 
to agency theory arguments, we find that ownership concentration is associated with higher CEO 
compensation, indicating some sort of misappropriation of minority shareholders’ interests. 
Similarly, CEO duality appears to have a negative relationship with CEO compensation. This 
particularly has important implication as separation of these positions has become mandatory 
                                                          
1Given the dominance of controlling shareholders in the developing markets, Jameson et al. (2014), for instance, call 
for more country level studies to better understand the influence of controlling shareholders on minority shareholders. 
2 Our findings are in contrast to the results of two existing studies (Kashif and Mustafa, 2012, Shah et al., 2009) on 
CEO compensation in Pakistan. These existing studies, however, are limited in scope and do not attempt to provide 
rigorous analysis.  
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requirement in the revised Code of corporate governance in Pakistan. Overall, we highlight that 
corporate governance variables do not seem to influence CEO compensation in the expected 
directions as suggested by the agency theory. 
Third, our study considers persistence and adjustment of CEO pay by examining the effect of 
lagged compensation on current compensation using dynamic panel model estimation. Further, 
bulk of the existing studies typically uses panel data estimation using fixed or random effects 
models. These models, however, do not control for potential endogeneity problems. Results based 
on these panel data models are pruned to estimation problems. As a consequence, we also employ 
more robust methodological procedure such as Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) that 
simultaneously accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, serial correlation, and endogeneity 
problems.  
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Literature review and hypotheses development is 
presented in section two. Section three describes data and methodological procedures. Section four 
provides empirical results while conclusions are presented in section five. 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
CEO Compensation and Firm Performance 
In agency theory, the corporate boards, assuming the power to look after the firm, involve in 
arm’s length transaction with CEO and design such compensation plans which provide CEO with 
efficient incentives to maximize the shareholder value, and hence reduce moral hazard problem 
arising from separation of ownership from control (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). This predicts a 
positive link between CEO compensation and firm performance. A number of studies (e.g., 
Bayless, 2009, Buck et al., 2008, Conyon and He, 2011, Conyon and He, 2012, Murphy, 1999, 
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Ozkan, 2011) find evidence consistent with agency theory. However, there are other competing 
theories that emerge in response to the finding that pay-performance relationship is modest (see, 
Tosi et al., 2000, van Essen et al., 2012a). The most prominent one is managerial power theory 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2003).  
According to managerial power theory (MPT), if the balance of power shifts towards CEOs 
and they behave opportunistically then there is likelihood that CEOs would involve in rent 
extraction through setting their compensation high that is not in the interests of shareholders 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). With increased power of CEO, the board of directors and 
compensation committee, under the influence of CEO, compromise their fiduciary duties and settle 
upon excessive CEO compensation possibly not linked to firm performance (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2003).  
In Pakistani context, CEOs tend to be more powerful than the boards because they are either 
heads of the controlling families or have strong ties with controlling shareholders (Javid and Iqbal, 
2008, Kamran and Shah, 2014). The strong ties between CEOs and family/controlling shareholders 
suggest greater possibility of expropriation of minority shareholders’ interests (Type II agency 
problem). In addition, the expropriation of minority shareholders’ interests increases when formal 
institutions such as legal system and investor protection are weak. Therefore, given this context, 
we expect that CEO compensation contracts are not based on arm’s length transaction between the 
board of directors and CEOs, instead these are more likely to be based on mutual interests of CEOs 
and controlling shareholders. Hence, we state our hypothesis that: 
H1: Firm performance does not influence CEO compensation  
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CEO Compensation and Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance assumes the role of monitoring and curbing managerial opportunism 
so that shareholder’s interests are protected (Fama and Jensen, 1983). As an efficient corporate 
governance structure provides close monitoring and oversight of management, therefore in the 
presence of strong corporate governance, the executive compensation would be low.  
A number of corporate governance variables have been reported to influence the CEO 
compensation, however, their influence seems to be conditioned to the context under examination 
(see, e.g.,Core et al., 1999, Devers et al., 2007, Sun et al., 2010, van Essen et al., 2012b). Since 
concentrated and family ownership is an important feature of corporate governance environment 
in Pakistan and board composition has been one of the major focuses in the Code of corporate 
governance to mitigate the agency conflicts (see, SECP, 2002, SECP, 2012), therefore we focus 
on concentrated/family ownership and board structure (Board size, Board independence and CEO 
duality) in this study.    
Ownership Concentration, Family Ownership and CEO Compensation 
Concentrated and family ownership can affect CEO compensation contract in two competing 
ways, 1) interest alignment effect and 2) entrenchment effect. According to interest alignment 
effect, which relates to agency theory, large or family shareholders have strong incentives to 
oversee agents’ activities because of being insiders, strong commitment and better firm specific 
knowledge (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006, Harris and Raviv, 2008, Jensen and Warner, 1988, Su et 
al., 2010). Therefore, concentrated and family ownership generally suggests that shareholders are 
better able to protect their interests in their companies, leading to reduced managerial opportunism, 
higher interest alignment and lower CEO compensation. 
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However, entrenchment effect suggests that family or controlling shareholders can 
expropriate minority shareholders’ interests through many ways including excessive compensation 
packages (see, Croci et al., 2012, Su et al., 2010, Wang and Xiao, 2011). CEOs in close relation 
with controlling shareholders/family may set their own pay opportunistically high, thereby 
expropriating the minority shareholders’ wealth. Such expropriation is very likely in emerging 
markets where formal institutions are weak to support mutually beneficial impersonal exchange 
between economic players (see, Jameson et al., 2014, Young et al., 2008). Since Pakistan is an 
emerging market with weak legal systems, therefore we hypothesize that: 
H2a: Ownership concentration has a positive impact on CEO compensation  
H2b: CEO compensation is higher in family firms than in non-family firms  
Board Size and CEO Compensation 
Board size is considered as an important determinant of board effectiveness. It has significant 
contribution towards quality of governance (Jensen, 1993, Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Larger 
boards are likely to correlate with greater level of expertise and firm’s ability to extract critical 
resources (Dalton et al., 1999, Provan, 1980). However, they may become so heavy, leading to 
ineffective executive monitoring (Jensen, 1993). Larger boards are less likely to function 
effectively and are easier to be controlled by executives (Jensen, 1993, Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). 
In addition, they are likely to be plagued with communication and coordination problem (Ozkan, 
2007). Thus, larger boards are assumed to compromise their monitoring role and hence weaken 
the internal governance structure. Consequently, executives gain more power over the internal 
control mechanisms, leading to more influence on their own pay, resulting in higher executive 
compensation. Many studies find that larger boards are related to higher executive compensation 
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(e.g., Core et al., 1999, Croci et al., 2012, Fahlenbrach, 2009, Ozkan, 2011, Shah et al., 2009, van 
Essen et al., 2012b).  
In Pakistan, board size generally tends to be driven by directors appointed from the controlling 
families or by proxy directors working on behalf of controlling shareholders. Consequently, it is 
less likely that board size has any effective role in reducing agency conflicts. In that case, board 
size is not expected to influence CEO compensation. Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
H3: Board size has no influence on the CEO compensation  
Board Independence and CEO Compensation 
Agency theory suggests that independent directors are likely to play important role in aligning 
shareholder-manager interests by providing adequate monitoring. Independent outside directors 
are less subject to collude with management and have reputation to protect shareholders in the 
labor market (Core et al., 1999, Fama and Jensen, 1983). On the other hand, inside directors are 
more obligated to CEO and can be under greater CEO influence, leading to compromised CEO 
monitoring to get personal benefits from CEO such as career opportunities (see, Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003, Weisbach, 2007). Nevertheless, external directors are also prone to have negative 
impact on internal governance if they have some secret relationship with management (Core et al., 
1999). Overall, board independence is expected to be related to less managerial opportunism, 
leading to lower executive compensation. 
Empirically, available evidence is mixed over the relationship between board independence 
and executive compensation. For example, Boyd (1994) and Core et al. (1999) find positive 
association, while others (e.g., Byrd and Cooperman, 2010, Conyon and He, 2011, Conyon and 
He, 2012) find no or negative relationship between number of independent directors in board and 
executive compensation. Given the Pakistani context where non-executive directors are generally 
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hired from within the family or obligated to work on behalf of controlling shareholders (Javid and 
Iqbal, 2008, World Bank, 2005), we may expect so-called board independence to become 
irrelevant in corporate decision making, leading to non-negative relation between CEO pay and 
board independence. Therefor our hypothesis is:  
H4: Board Independence has no impact on CEO compensation  
CEO Duality and CEO Compensation 
CEO duality (CEO as chairman board of directors at the same time) provides opportunities to 
“self-interested” CEOs to influence major decisions in order to maximize their own utilities instead 
of maximizing shareholders’ wealth (Core et al., 1999, Jensen, 1993). CEO duality reduces the 
board independence and increases the executive powers over control decisions including designing 
executive compensation contracts, leading to higher executive compensation. Thus, CEO duality 
is considered to be a sign of inefficient corporate governance in both agency theory and managerial 
power theory.   
Empirically, most of the studies (e.g., Boyd, 1994, Brick et al., 2006, Conyon and He, 2012, 
Core et al., 1999, Fahlenbrach, 2009, van Essen et al., 2012b) find positive association between 
CEO duality and executive compensation, indicating the likelihood of CEO entrenchment and 
excessive payment to CEO when he/she is also a chairman board of directors. In Pakistan, Code 
of corporate governance encourages companies to separate CEO position from chairman board of 
directors.3 Thus, CEO duality is considered to be a potential cause of managerial entrenchment in 
Pakistan. Accordingly, we expect that CEO compensation is higher when CEO also holds the 
position of chairman board of directors. We formally hypothesize that: 
H5: CEO duality has a positive impact on CEO compensation 
                                                          
3 In the revised version of the Code of corporate governance issued in March 2012, separation of position of 
chairman from CEO is mandatory with effect from year 2013.  
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Methodology 
Data 
We focus on all the non-financial firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), Pakistan for 
the period 2005 to 2012. Out of 399 non-financial listed companies classified in 12 industrial 
groups by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), 139 companies are dropped because either they are 
declared as defaulted by KSE, newly listed or merged/demerged (86 companies), or their data on 
corporate governance and compensation is not available (53 companies). All the data is extracted 
from companies’ annual reports collected by hand from different sources including SBP, KSE and 
companies’ websites. As we go farther from 2012, the availability of annual reports decreases 
therefore sample period is restricted to start from 2005.  
For the remaining 260 companies, we managed to collect data for at least three consecutive 
years, making an unbalanced panel data containing 1836 firm-year observations. However, out of 
1836 firm-year observations 328 observations are dropped because in those observations, CEOs 
are not paid any compensation. Final sample contains 1508 firm-year observations from 225 firms 
for the period 2005 to 2012.  
 
Static CEO Pay Model 
Following existing literature (e.g., Gallego and Larrain, 2012, Murphy, 1999, Sun et al., 2013, 
Wang and Xiao, 2011), the following linear model is estimated to test the association of CEO 
compensation with firm performance and corporate governance in a static pay process: 
 
𝐿𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽6𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽10𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽12𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽13𝐹𝑀𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽14𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐶𝐻𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                   (1) 
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Where LNCOMPit is log of compensation. In Pakistan, long term incentive plans, stock 
options and restricted stocks are virtually non-existent. CEOs are paid in the form of base salary, 
cash bonuses, perks and benefits and post-employment benefits. Companies use many accountings 
heads in disclosure and nomenclature of the accounting heads is not uniform across the firms. The 
predominantly used accountings heads include managerial remuneration, bonus, leave 
encashment, house rent, utilities, medical expenses, gratuity, provident fund and retirement 
benefits. Consistent with existing literature, we use two measures of CEO compensation i.e., cash 
compensation and total compensation. Cash compensation includes managerial remuneration and 
bonuses while total compensation is the sum of all the components. ROAit, return on assets, 
represents accounting performance and it is measured as ratio of income before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) to total assets. TRETit, total return to shareholder, represents market performance and it is 
measured as current market price of shares plus dividend for the current year divided by previous 
year market price. In Pakistan, it takes about four months until annual reports are published and 
distributed. Therefore, to avoid any inconsistencies, market price per share is taken on the date that 
is four months after the closing date.  
 OWNCONS represents ownership concentration. Consistent with existing literature (see, 
Holderness, 2014, La Porta et al., 1999), we use ownership of largest shareholder as a proxy for 
ownership concentration. FAMOWN is a dummy variable taking value 1 for family firms and zero 
otherwise. Following Anderson and Reeb (2003), Achleitner et al. (2014) and others, we define a 
family firm that fulfills one of the two conditions, 1) a person or family group hold at least 25% 
of voting right as measured by the percentage of shares owned directly or indirectly, 2) two or 
more family members sit on the board of directors.  
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BDSIZE, board size, is measured as number of directors sitting on the board as mentioned in 
the annual reports. Although Code of corporate governance in Pakistan encourages the 
representation of independent directors on the board, however, this has not been a mandatory 
requirement until year 2013. Further, disclosure regarding independent director is very much 
inconsistent across the companies. Therefore, we use ratio of non-executive directors to board size 
as a measure of board independence (B_IND). DUALCEO is CEO-duality and it is incorporated 
as a dummy variable taking the value of one if CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors 
and zero otherwise. 
Institutional ownership and group affiliation are important drivers of corporate governance in 
emerging markets. According to agency theory, institutional ownership serves a monitoring role 
and is related to lower CEO compensation (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). Similarly, behavior of 
business group firms is known to be different from their counterparts (Siegel and Choudhury, 
2012). Ghosh (2006), for instance, reports that CEO compensation is lower in group affiliated 
firms in India which have similar socioeconomic structure like Pakistan’s. We therefore, control 
for institutional ownership and group affiliation. Institutional ownership (INSTOWN) is measured 
by percentage of shares held by institutions while Group (GROUP) is a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 if a firm belongs to a group and zero otherwise.  
Other control variables include firm size (FIRMSIZE) which is measured as log of total assets, 
firm risk (FIRMRSK), which is measured as standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the 
fiscal year, growth opportunities (MTB) proxied by market to book ratio as measured by market 
value per share divided by book value per share, firm age (FMAGE) as indicated in the annual 
reports. 
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Firm size is perhaps one of the most cited determinants of CEO compensation across the 
world. Countless studies report that firm size is positively related to executive compensation (e.g., 
Devers et al., 2007, Frydman and Jenter, 2010). Managing a risky company needs better 
managerial skills, leading to higher compensations (Brick et al., 2006, Conyon and He, 2011, Core 
et al., 1999). Firms with greater growth opportunities are expected to hire the executives with better 
skills who can exploit the available growth opportunities to maximize the shareholder value. This 
leads to a positive link between growth opportunity and CEO compensation (e.g., Brick et al., 
2006, Conyon and He, 2012, Ho et al., 2004). Similarly, aged firms are more likely to devise more 
efficient compensation contracts (see, e.g.,Conyon and He, 2012, Ho et al., 2004). Finally, if CEO 
is replaced in a firm, the new contract is unlikely to be the same as the previous one. Further, if 
CEO is replaced in the middle of a year, there would be two persons drawing compensation in a 
year. Therefore, to account for such instances, we include a variable (CEOCHNG) that represents 
how many times a firm changes its CEO during the year, measured as an interaction term of 
dummy variable taking value 1 if CEO is replaced during the year and number of CEOs drawing 
remuneration during the year. 
In order to account for unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate fixed effect model after 
performing Hausman (1978) test. In addition, Both Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
heteroskedasticity test and White heteroskedasticity test indicate the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. Similarly, Wooldridge (2002) test for serial correlation in panel data suggests 
the presence of serial correlation in error terms. Therefore, we use Huber-White robust standard 
errors clustered at firm level. This adjustment of standard errors accounts for both 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Greene, 2011).  
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CEO Pay Persistence and Dynamic Panel Model 
Agency theory assumes that executive compensation contracts are static pay-for-performance 
contracts, where CEO compensation is in equilibrium in each period. However, learning is an 
important factor that affects wage dynamics within a firm (Conyon and He, 2012). When an 
employee enters the labor market, his/her ability is partially observable by the employer. 
Education, experience, and other characteristics do reflect initial quality of the employee but still 
this information is incomplete. Therefore, initial wage decision has to be made by the employer 
on the basis of employee’s expected performance. The employer then gradually learns about 
capabilities of the employee from his/her subsequent real performance. The employer’s 
information and belief about the employee’s performance accumulate and are serially correlated 
(Conyon and He, 2012). Therefore, wages based on such expectations are expected to correlate in 
adjacent years. This potential correlation however is ignored in the majority of previous studies on 
executive compensation (Conyon and He, 2012). Another viewpoint that is relevant to adjacent 
year correlation in executive compensation is anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic (Bender, 2003, 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Tversky and Kahneman (1974), for instance, suggest that in many 
situations people make numerical estimates by starting from an initial value (the anchor), and 
adjusting this to yield a final answer. However, the adjustments made are usually insufficient 
therefore different starting points yield different estimates which are biased towards the anchor 
(Bender, 2003, Raithatha and Komera, 2016). The board of directors/compensation committee 
often have a figure as a starting point i.e., prior year’s compensation which has an influence on the 
current pay levels (Bender, 2003, Raithatha and Komera, 2016). 
As argued above, the current CEO compensation may be a function of previous year’s CEO 
compensation because of incomplete information and dynamic learning process, and anchoring-
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and-adjustment heuristic. Therefore, we also estimate dynamic panel model in addition to static 
panel model to account for CEO pay persistence and dynamic adjustment.  
The estimated model is as follows: 
𝐿𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛾𝐿𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽4𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐵𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽11𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽12𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽13𝐹𝑀𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽14𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐶𝐻𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                      (2) 
 
The definitions of variables are the same as in model (1).  
We estimate model (2) using instrumental variable (IV) approach and generalized method of 
moment (GMM) estimator. This strategy control for potential endogeneity problem in addition to 
unobserved heterogeneity. Before proceeding, we first test the endogeneity of the regressors using 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test for endogeneity of all the regressors following Schultz et al. 
(2010) and Nguyen et al. (2015). 
We use system-GMM approach because it is more efficient (Blundell and Bond, 1998, 
Roodman, 2009). System-GMM reduces the effect of high persistence of corporate governance 
variables thereby improving the power of estimations (Blundell and Bond, 1998, Nguyen et al., 
2015). In addition, system-GMM appears to be the best-performing estimator for the data which 
is characterized by moderate length of time, low within firm variations in corporate governance 
variables, possibility of fixed effects driven dependent variable, some variables are endogenous 
and a dynamic relationship exists between variables (Filatotchev et al., 2013, Nguyen et al., 2015, 
Zhou et al., 2014). Our data reasonably possess similar properties. The choice of instrumental 
variables is crucial in GMM estimation techniques. We use Sargan (1958)/Hansen (1982) over-
identification tests and Arellano and Bond (1991) autocorrelation test for validity and suitability 
of the instrumental variables4.  
                                                          
4 See Roodman (2009) for details 
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Empirical Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. CEO compensation is deflated to the base year 2005 
using Consumer Price Index (CPI). During 2005 to 2007 CEO compensation increases first then 
appears to be decreasing in financial crisis period till 2010. After that again there is an upward 
trend. Consistently lower median value than mean value indicates that the distribution of 
compensation is positively skewed suggesting that greater number of CEOs are receiving pay that 
is less than overall average pays. 
Mean Return on Assets (ROA) of pooled sample is 10.99 percent with standard deviation of 
13.39 percent while median is 9.51%. Average ROA does not seem to vary abnormally across the 
years. ROA decreases from 12.52% in year 2006 to 10.17% in year 2007 followed by 9.78% in 
year 2008 and 9.26% in year 2009. This is possibly because of three reasons: 1) unrest due to 
political issues and general elections, 2) start of energy crisis in Pakistan or 3) effects of financial 
crisis.  
Market return, appears to be more fluctuating than ROA. In year 2005 average market return 
is 27.70% which dramatically decrease to 3.49% in year 2006 followed by an increase to 24.87% 
in year 2007. Negative returns in year 2008 and 2009 seem to be indicating political unrest, energy 
crisis and financial crisis. Recovery seems to start after that with positive market returns. 
Average board size of pooled sample appears to be slightly above 8 with standard deviation 
of 1.57.  Recently, Jameson et al. (2014) report similar average board size of 8 for Indian firms. 
This is possibly due to resemblance in institutional setting of concentrated and family ownership 
structure in India and Pakistan. The average board size in Pakistan is lower than the board size 
recently reported for China (mean 9.372 and median 9) and US (mean 9.54 and median 9) where 
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state has the major stake in the firms or ownership is widely held (see, Conyon, 2014, Huang and 
Wang, 2015). 
Boards are comprised of 63% non-executive directors on average. However, percentage of 
non-executive directors has slightly downward trend till 2011, seemingly because of decrease in 
board size over time. The non-executive directors are more likely to be an easy target when board 
size needs to be reduced. 
About 75% observations in our sample are from family firms and, quite expectedly, this ratio 
is almost stable over the sample period. The largest shareholder appears to be holding more than 
30% average voting shares, indicating a highly-concentrated ownership environment. 
Interestingly, ownership concentration has slightly increasing trend over time which could have 
implications for CEO compensation contracts.  
On average about 34% CEOs appear to be holding the position of chairman board of directors 
also. CEO duality shows maximum value i.e., 36% in 2008, 2009 and 2010, the time characterized 
by political unrest, energy crisis and financial crisis. However, recent downward trend in 2011 and 
2012 seems to be consistent with greater emphasis on separating the position of chairman and CEO 
in Pakistan. This recent trend is similar to the UK and China where emphasis is on separating the 
post of CEO from the chairman, and unlike the US where it is usual to combine these two positions 
(Conyon and He, 2012).   
[Table 1 near here] 
 
[Table 2 near here] 
Correlation Analysis 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix. Log transformation is performed for compensation 
variables and firm size proxy i.e., total assets. Multicollinearity does not seem to be a problem in 
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the data as none of the absolute values of correlation coefficients between explanatory variables is 
greater than 0.70. This is further confirmed by variance inflation factor (VIF) as none of the VIF 
is greater than the commonly used threshold level of 10 (unreported). 
Both cash and total compensation have positive correlation with accounting performance 
(ROA) but correlation with market performance (market return) is not significant although sign is 
positive. Board structure variables board size and board independence are also positively 
correlated with compensation, indicating potential ineffectiveness of board structure in monitoring 
and reducing CEO compensation. Family firms seem to pay lower compensation to CEO as 
depicted by negative correlation between family ownership and both measures of CEO 
compensation.  
Inconsistent with agency theory, ownership concentration is positively correlated with 
compensation. Similarly, CEO duality is negatively correlated with CEO compensation which is 
inconsistent with both agency theory and managerial power theory. Firm size, market to book and 
firm age appear to have positive correlation with compensation. However, CEO compensation is 
reduced as firm risk increases which is inconsistent with the argument that risky firms need to pay 
higher compensation to their CEOs. 
 
Estimation Results 
Table 3 presents the estimation results for total compensation and cash compensation as 
dependent variables. Robust standard errors are reported for pooled and fixed effect models while 
Wind-Meijer-corrected standard errors are reported for dynamic panel models. Arellano-Bond 
serial correlation tests m1 & m2 and instrument over-identification tests are also reported at the 
bottom of the table. Arellano-Bond test for second order (m2) validates the use of second and 
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earlier lags of dependent variables as instruments. None of the values of m2 rejects the hypothesis 
of no second order correlation in error terms. Similarly, p-values of over-identification tests, 
Sargan test and Hansen J test, do not lead to rejecting the hypothesis of joint validity of the 
instruments used.  
Consistent with the agency theory, both measures of CEO compensation are positively related 
to current firm accounting performance as measured by ROA. The results are consistent 
qualitatively over different model specifications. This confirms that despite CEOs are seemingly 
more powerful than the boards, their compensation is still linked to firms’ accounting performance. 
This finding seems to be inconsistent with managerial power hypothesis and expropriation view 
as discussed earlier. 
Market returns do not significantly contribute to pay setting process as coefficient of market 
return is not significantly different from zero in all models. Since CEO compensation in Pakistan 
rarely includes any restricted stocks, stock options and other stock based bonuses, therefore weak 
link between CEO compensation and market performance is expected. Another possible reason 
for an insignificant relationship between CEO compensation and market performance could be 
that Pakistani bourses are considered to be highly volatile (Sheikh and Riaz, 2012), therefore using 
market performance as benchmark for setting CEO compensation may not be a good choice.  
 
[Table 3 near here] 
 
We also find positive pay-performance link for past accounting performance when we replace 
current firm performance variables with their lagged values in the models (unreported). However, 
surprisingly, lagged market performance appears to have negative association with both measures 
of CEO compensation. This negative association may be interpreted as sign of cronyism which 
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predict negative association between excessive pay and firm performance (Brick et al., 2006). 
However, we believe that this negative association is more probably due to highly volatile bourses 
in Pakistan. During the periods of bad market performance, especially from 2008 to 2011, the 
compensation may have increased due to positive accounting performance, leading to negative 
relationship between current compensation and previous year market performance.  
Consistent with pay persistence and dynamic adjustment arguments as discussed above, the 
coefficients of lagged CEO pay in dynamic panel models are positive and significant, indicating 
that CEO pay is highly persistent and takes time to adjust to its long-term equilibrium level. The 
boards consider previous year CEO compensation as a reference point while setting next year 
compensation. This is an important finding of this study as most of the literature on CEO 
compensation ignores the dynamic nature of CEO compensation and estimate static pay models 
considering that pay is in equilibrium. 
Ownership concentration appears to have positive impact on both measures of CEO 
compensation which is consistent with our hypothesis. The coefficients of ownership 
concentration are significantly positive. This is consistent with expropriation view which leads to 
support hypothesis 2a. Controlling shareholders might be engaged in colluding with management 
to get personal benefits at the expense of minority shareholders thus overlooking level of CEO 
compensation.  
In pooled regression, CEOs seem to receive lower compensation in family firms. However, in 
fixed effect and dynamic panel model, the coefficients of family ownership do not appear to be 
significant. Thus, we find weak evidence that family ownership significantly influence the CEO 
pay setting process. The inconsistencies in results across different models need to be explored 
further using more variables on family characteristics as discussed by Bertrand and Schoar (2006).  
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Inconsistent with many studies (e.g., Core et al., 1999, Croci et al., 2012, Fahlenbrach, 2009, 
Ozkan, 2011, Shah et al., 2009, van Essen et al., 2012b), the coefficient of board size is consistently 
insignificant in all models which suggests that board size does not matter. Similarly, the coefficient 
of board independence is insignificant in all models, indicating no influence of non-executive 
directors on CEO pay process. These results are consistent with the general view that boards in 
Pakistan are dominated by non-executive directors who are hired from within the family or they 
have close relation with controlling shareholders (Javid and Iqbal, 2008). These are gray directors 
who do not have real influence on decisions made by family/controlling shareholders. The number 
of such directors does not matter hence the board size does not matter. Thus, our hypotheses 3 and 
4 are supported.  
Surprisingly, in contrast to many existing studies (e.g., Boyd, 1994, Brick et al., 2006, Conyon 
and He, 2012, Core et al., 1999, Fahlenbrach, 2009, van Essen et al., 2012b), CEO duality appears 
to be significantly negatively related to both measures of CEO compensation. The coefficients of 
CEO duality are consistently negative in all model specifications. Thus, the argument that more 
concentrated power in one person by combining the position of CEO and chairman board of 
directors leads to expropriation through higher CEO compensation is not supported in Pakistan.  
Group affiliation is not creating any significant difference in level of CEO compensation as 
indicated by insignificant coefficients. However, institutional holding does have significant 
positive influence on CEO compensation. This questions the monitoring role of institutional 
ownership as suggested by the agency theory (see, Hartzell and Starks, 2003). 
Firm size as measured by log of total assets appears to be significantly positively related to 
both measures of CEO compensation in all models. This supports the argument that larger firms 
are complex and difficult to run and hence require quality CEOs with higher compensations. As 
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expected, firm age is positively associated with CEO compensation, while newly appointed CEOs 
are more likely to start with lower compensation than the leaving CEOs as suggested by some 
significant negative coefficients of CEO changed. Other control variables, firm risk and market to 
book, do not appear to influence CEO compensation decisions.  
Robustness Checks 
Although results presented are robust across different model specifications however, we carry 
out some further tests of robustness of our results. First, all the continuous variables are winsorized 
using 1% level at both tails to eliminate potential outliers and all models are re-estimated. But, the 
results do not change qualitatively therefore it is decided to report the original data results. Second, 
alternative measures of firm accounting performance, firm size and ownership concentration, such 
as, log of net sales, earnings per share (EPS) and voting shares held by three largest shareholders 
respectively, are incorporated. Again, the results remain qualitatively similar to as reported above. 
Third, to control for endogeneity problem, following a number of studies (e.g., Croci et al., 2012, 
Ozkan, 2011) current values of all independent variables except firm age and change of CEO in 
Model (1) are replaced with their lagged values treating them as potential cause of endogeneity. 
However, again, results remain largely unaltered. We also estimate models by incorporating group, 
family ownership, ownership concentration, institutional ownership individually but results 
remain largely the same as reported. Since correlation between these variables and variance 
inflation factor are within acceptable range therefore we decided to report them in one model.   
Conclusions 
In Pakistan, investor protection and legal systems are weak. Therefore, firms’ ownership is 
concentrated in few individuals or families, leading to more agency problems between controlling 
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and minority shareholders. Further, Code of corporate governance issued to improve corporate 
governance practices in Pakistan has much emphasis on the board structure. Given the Pakistani 
context, we study how firm performance, concentrated/family ownership and board structure 
contribute towards CEO pay setting process.  
Using different model specifications including a dynamic panel model that also account for 
dynamic adjustment of dependent variable and control for endogeneity problem, we find that 
current and previous year firm accounting performance has significant positive influence on CEO 
compensation. However, firm current market performance does not have any influence on CEO 
compensation but surprisingly previous year’s market performance seems to be negatively 
influencing the CEO compensation. We believe that this negative association is mainly driven by 
highly volatile markets in Pakistan which are preventing boards to base CEO compensation on 
market performance.  
An important finding of this study is that CEO pay is highly persistent and takes time to adjust 
to long-run equilibrium. Thus, current CEO compensation also depends upon their previous year 
compensation and their innate time-invariant capabilities which are not fully observable initially 
but gradually in subsequent periods through their real outputs. Further, the boards use previous 
year CEO compensation as starting point to set next year compensation.  
Inconsistent with agency theory, we find that ownership concentration has positive impact on 
CEO compensation. This finding supports the rent extraction view. There may be some sort of 
collusions between management and largest shareholder for rent extraction. In addition, we find 
weak evidence that CEOs in family firms receive lower compensation than their counterparts. 
Thus, overall, ownership structure does not affect CEO compensation as suggested by agency 
theory.  
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Board structure variables, board size and board independence, have no convincing influence 
on CEO compensation in any direction, indicating that board size and the number of non-executive 
directors do not matter when CEO compensation is set. Although agency theory suggest that CEO 
duality leads to higher CEO compensation, however we find that CEO duality actually leads to 
lower CEO compensation in Pakistan.  
Overall, our findings suggest that firms’ accounting performance is an important determinant 
of CEO compensation. However, ownership concentration and board structure variables are not 
affecting CEO compensation in the way suggested by agency theory. Therefore, in order to 
understand CEO pay puzzle and corporate governance in emerging markets, future research needs 
to account for differences in institutional context of the market under examination.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Statistic 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Pooled 
Sample Cash Pay Mean 3353 3631 4092 3958 3784 3639 3720 4227 3810 
Rs. in ‘000’ Median 2000 2134 2338 2031 2165 1909 1979 2338 2104 
Base 2005 S.D 4626 5412 6706 6636 5588 5362 5173 6656 5819 
Total Pay Mean 4817 5125 5609 5414 5292 5229 5255 5887 5341 
Rs. in ‘000' Median 3156 3136 3577 3260 3151 3021 2997 3389 3210 
Base 2005 S.D 5854 6515 7833 7896 7108 6927 6672 8986 7306 
Return on  Mean 11.93 12.52 10.17 9.78 9.26 12.28 11.74 10.54 10.99 
Assets %  Median 9.14 9.58 7.86 7.96 9.53 11.20 10.84 10.32 9.51 
  S.D 11.07 10.67 11.23 11.52 19.31 11.73 12.96 14.80 13.39 
Market Mean 27.70 3.49 24.87 -14.35 -1.73 8.37 -0.47 86.46 16.74 
Return % Median 18.97 -1.01 7.38 -27.20 -18.04 -6.14 -9.99 47.84 -0.84 
 S.D 52.18 39.08 71.94 80.74 67.19 62.89 72.12 114.89 80.04 
Ownership Mean 32.72 33.01 33.07 33.23 33.36 33.61 34.39 35.51 33.67 
Concentration Median 26.46 26.61 26.71 26.25 26.13 26.13 27.45 29.40 26.66 
%  S.D 21.01 21.22 20.78 20.48 20.44 20.30 20.74 21.32 20.74 
Family Mean 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.75 
Ownership Median 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  S.D 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.43 
Board Mean 8.13 8.15 8.08 8.04 8.01 8.00 8.01 8.00 8.05 
 Size Median 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 
  S.D 1.68 1.68 1.62 1.57 1.53 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.57 
Board Mean 64.32 64.31 63.90 63.65 62.85 63.23 62.58 63.91 63.54 
Independence Median 70.00 70.71 70.00 66.67 66.67 66.67 62.50 66.67 66.67 
 % S.D 20.37 20.72 20.71 20.59 20.94 20.64 20.31 19.96 20.49 
CEO Duality Mean 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.34 
  Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  S.D 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.47 
Institutional  Mean 13.93 13.48 13.10 13.92 13.22 12.21 11.60 10.65 13.22 
Ownership Median 10.82 9.90 10.06 11.31 10.00 10.14 8.75 7.34 10.00 
% S.D 12.52 11.91 10.78 11.71 11.19 10.39 10.50 9.93 11.19 
Group Firm Mean 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.62 0.61 
 Median 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 S.D 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
Total Assets Mean 7173 8607 9827 10898 11636 12675 14490 17215 11833 
Rs in  Median 2385 2603 2970 3042 3034 3068 3544 3831 3061 
Millions S.D 14281 16821 18677 22158 26033 31098 35893 45860 29092 
Firm Risk % Mean 15.03 12.15 12.70 13.24 24.29 17.88 14.07 15.97 15.88 
 Median 13.54 11.20 12.13 11.66 19.32 13.18 11.15 13.29 13.01 
  S.D 8.00 8.51 6.63 7.74 23.59 15.63 11.00 11.37 13.59 
Market to Mean 1.79 2.35 2.17 1.74 1.56 1.31 1.30 1.84 1.73 
Book Median 1.19 0.99 1.13 0.86 0.62 0.52 0.43 0.65 0.75 
  S.D 2.37 8.17 4.76 4.77 4.81 6.03 4.58 5.62 5.35 
Firm Age Mean 31.03 31.84 32.56 32.87 34.01 35.06 36.14 37.50 34.06 
Years Median 27.00 28.00 29.00 29.00 30.00 31.00 32.00 33.00 30.00 
  S.D 16.65 16.75 16.48 16.43 16.61 16.56 16.46 16.59 16.65 
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Table 2 
Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Total Compensation (1) 1.00               
Cash Compensation (2) 0.97* 1.00              
Return on Assets (3) 0.31* 0.31* 1.00             
Market Return (4) 0.02 0.02 0.17* 1.00            
Ownership 
Concentration 
(5) 
0.36* 0.37* 0.22* 0.05 1.00           
Family Ownership (6) -0.38* -0.38* -0.22* 0.02 -0.54* 1.00          
Board Size (7) 0.32* 0.31* 0.13* -0.00 0.10* -0.45* 1.00         
Board Independence (8) 0.19* 0.14* 0.03 -0.02 0.06* -0.23* 0.35* 1.00        
CEO Duality (9) 
-0.29* -0.28* -0.17* 0.01 -0.08* 0.17* -0.26* -0.19* 1.00 
     
 
Institutional 
Ownership 
(10) 
0.15* 0.12* -0.04 -0.06* -0.15* 0.00 0.14* 0.16* -0.06* 1.00      
Group Firm (11) 0.08* 0.06* 0.08* 0.00 -0.17* 0.28* -0.06* 0.04 -0.16* 0.07* 1.00     
Firm Size (12) 0.58* 0.56* 0.17* -0.04 0.25* -0.28* 0.38* 0.13* -0.22* -0.00 0.06* 1.00    
Firm Risk (13) -0.20* -0.20* -0.19* 0.20* -0.04 0.12* -0.13* -0.07* 0.20* 0.00 -0.10* -0.24* 1.00   
Market to Book (14) 0.09* 0.12* 0.18* 0.07* 0.28* -0.17* 0.08* -0.12* -0.10* -0.13* 0.04 0.08* -0.09* 1.00  
Firm Age (15) 0.25* 0.24* 0.07* 0.04 0.20* -0.22* 0.19* 0.05* -0.02 0.07* 0.01 0.12* -0.03 0.04 1.00 
(*) p-value < 0.05  
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Table 3 
CEO Compensation and Firm Performance 
 
 Log of Total Compensation  Log of Cash Compensation 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pooled Fixed Effects Dynamic 
Panel 
(GMM) 
 Pooled Fixed Effects Dynamic 
Panel 
(GMM) 
        
Lagged Compensation ---- ---- 0.7989***  ---- ---- 0.8921*** 
   (0.0582)    (0.0524) 
Return on Assets 1.2984*** 1.3044*** 0.5618***  1.3316*** 1.3326*** 0.5025*** 
 (0.3746) (0.3412) (0.1581)  (0.3936) (0.3651) (0.1660) 
Market Return 0.0258 -0.0323 -0.0592  0.0362 -0.0225 -0.0622 
 (0.0267) (0.0247) (0.0631)  (0.0273) (0.0260) (0.0749) 
Ownership Concentration 0.9356*** 0.7369** 0.1707*  1.0373*** 0.8581*** 0.0676 
 (0.3214) (0.2917) (0.0937)  (0.3340) (0.3118) (0.0954) 
Family Ownership -0.3407** -0.0552 -0.0490  -0.3363* -0.0918 -0.0331 
 (0.1568) (0.1577) (0.0441)  (0.1781) (0.1760) (0.0457) 
Board Size -0.0082 -0.0081 0.0066  0.0060 0.0141 0.0101 
 (0.0408) (0.0379) (0.0097)  (0.0469) (0.0431) (0.0112) 
Board Independence 0.2134 0.1669 0.0193  -0.0128 -0.0372 0.0445 
 (0.2788) (0.2556) (0.0723)  (0.2934) (0.2763) (0.0648) 
CEO Duality -0.2955** -0.1973* -0.0697*  -0.2842** -0.2018* -0.0207 
 (0.1153) (0.1046) (0.0376)  (0.1224) (0.1113) (0.0365) 
Institutional Ownership 1.6531*** 1.2969*** 0.2414*  1.5737*** 1.2684*** 0.1105 
 (0.4391) (0.3908) (0.1409)  (0.4702) (0.4121) (0.1537) 
Group Firm 0.1784 0.1553 0.0299  0.1279 0.1085 0.0120 
 (0.1222) (0.1053) (0.0341)  (0.1335) (0.1141) (0.0320) 
Firm Size 0.3516*** 0.3492*** 0.0671***  0.3516*** 0.3540*** 0.0410** 
 (0.0335) (0.0351) (0.0205)  (0.0357) (0.0377) (0.0178) 
Firm Risk -0.1904 -0.0907 -0.0645  -0.2956 -0.2104 0.0205 
 (0.1951) (0.1955) (0.1603)  (0.2028) (0.1956) (0.1965) 
Market to Book Ratio -0.0066 -0.0073 0.0016  -0.0024 -0.0046 0.0014 
 (0.0086) (0.0096) (0.0032)  (0.0082) (0.0092) (0.0027) 
Firm Age 0.0084** 0.0063** 0.0006  0.0081** 0.0054 -0.0005 
 (0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0008)  (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0008) 
Change of CEO -0.1156 -0.1116 0.0308  -0.1618** -0.1518** 0.0278 
 (0.0757) (0.0696) (0.0387)  (0.0812) (0.0751) (0.0369) 
        Observations 1,508 1,508 1277  1,508 1,508 1,277 
R-squared 0.4954 0.6216 ----  0.4681 0.5830 ---- 
Arellano-Bond        
AR(1) in Diff. (m1) p-value ---- ---- 0.000  ---- ---- 0.000 
AR(2) in Diff. (m2) p-value ---- ---- 0.764  ---- ---- 0.377 
Over identification test        
Sargan test p-value ---- ---- 0.149  ---- ---- 0.358 
Hansen J statistic p-values ---- ---- 0.788  ---- ---- 0.489 
 Dependent variable is log of compensation, Return on Assets is measured by earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets, Market Return 
is measured by current market price plus dividend divided by previous year market price minus one, Ownership Concentration is measured by voting 
shares held by the largest shareholder, Family Ownership is a dummy variable taking value one for family firms and zero otherwise, Board Size is 
measured by number of directors on board, Board Independence is measured by ratio of non-executive directors to board size, CEO Duality is a dummy 
variable taking value one if CEO is also chairman board of directors, Institutional Ownership is measured by percentage of total shares held by 
institutions. Group Firm is a dummy variable taking value 1 if a firm is affiliated with a group and zero otherwise, Firm Size is measured by log of total 
assets, Firm Risk is measured by standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the fiscal year, Market to Book Ratio is measured by market value 
divided by book value per share, Firm Age is number of years of establishment of the firm as mentioned in annual reports, Change of CEO is interaction 
term of dummy variable taking value 1 if CEO is replaced during the year and number of CEOs drawing remuneration during the year. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses for pooled and fixed effect models 
Windmeijer-corrected Standard errors in parentheses for dynamic panel model 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
